Blurring the distinction between empirical and normative legitimacy? A methodological commentary on ‘police legitimacy and citizen cooperation in China’ by Jackson, Jonathan & Bradford, Ben
Blurring the distinction between empirical and normative legitimacy? A 
methodological commentary on ‘police legitimacy and citizen 
cooperation in China’
LSE Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/100744/
Version: Published Version
Article:
Jackson, Jonathan and Bradford, Ben (2019) Blurring the distinction between 
empirical and normative legitimacy? A methodological commentary on ‘police 
legitimacy and citizen cooperation in China’. Asian Journal of Criminology. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11417-019-09289-w
lseresearchonline@lse.ac.uk
https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/ 
Reuse
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) 
licence. This licence allows you to distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon the work, even 
commercially, as long as you credit the authors for the original work. More information 
and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/
Blurring the Distinction Between Empirical
and Normative Legitimacy? A Methodological
Commentary on ‘Police Legitimacy and Citizen
Cooperation in China’
Jonathan Jackson
1
& Ben Bradford
2
Received: 7 January 2019 /Revised: 12 April 2019 /Accepted: 9 May 2019
# The Author(s) 2019
Abstract
In a fascinating study into the nature of police legitimacy in Southern China, Sun et al. (2018)
present evidence that what researchers have previously been treated as possible sources of
legitimacy—public perceptions of police conduct defined along the lines of procedural justice,
distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness—are in fact constituent components of
legitimacy. In this methodological commentary, we argue that the empirical strategy used to
reach this conclusion is not fit for purpose because both conceptual stances—possible sources
of legitimacy or constituent components of legitimacy—are consistent with the same fitted
statistical model. Analysing nationally representative data from 30 countries across Europe and
beyond, we also show that erroneous support for the approach to measurement is likely to be
found wherever one looks. To be sensitive to cultural context means using a methodology that
does not impose the preconditions of legitimacy, and we counsel against a trend starting in
international criminology that does precisely the opposite.
Keywords Legitimacy . Police .Measurement . Procedural justice . Distributive justice
The ability of the police to assert social control and reproduce social order depends on the
capacity to use force, so questions concerning the rightful use of this power are never far from
the political surface. Normative concerns about police powers are ever-present in the debates
that almost continuously roil around policing, yet police in liberal democracies rely on the
legitimacy they command and the public cooperation, deference and compliance it engenders,
and this raises empirical concerns about the extent to which the policed hold the police
legitimate.
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The past decade and more has seen the pathbreaking US-based work of Tom Tyler and
colleagues into the causes and consequences of public perceptions of police legitimacy spread
across the world (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2006a, 2006b). Studies into the sources of
police legitimacy have been carried out in social, political and legal contexts as diverse as
Ghana, Finland, the Russian Federation, the UK, Pakistan, Sweden, Japan, Israel, Australia,
Turkey, South Africa, France, Ukraine, China and Nigeria (for a review of the international
literature see Jackson 2018). In many of these countries, legitimacy seems to rest a good deal
on the extent to which police officers act in procedurally fair, neutral, transparent and
trustworthy ways when making decisions and interacting with the public.
Sun et al.’s (2018) recently published paper on police legitimacy in a coastal city in
Southern China is an excellent example of the increasingly international nature of this field
of enquiry (for others see Tsushima and Hamai 2015; Kim et al. 2018; Akinlabi and Murphy
2018; Bradford and Jackson 2018; Gerber et al. 2018; and Oliveira et al. 2019). Sensitivity to
context is important to their work. China is an authoritarian regime so it has ‘low account-
ability and high coercion’, hence people’s feelings of obligation to obey external legal
authority—often seen as a core aspect of empirical legitimacy (Tyler and Jackson 2013;
Pósch et al. 2019)—may be complex and varied. But people may also judge the legitimacy
of the police on the basis of procedural justice (fair process) and distributive justice (fair
aggregate allocation of outcomes) and effectiveness and lawfulness:
…the police in an authoritarian state are commonly empowered with excessive author-
ities that do not match normative expectations of democratic policing (e.g., procedural
fairness, institutional transparency, and accountability). Authoritarian policing is thus
prone to abusive treatments of the public and state manipulative efforts of performance.
Lawfulness, distributive justice, and effectiveness, originally proposed by Tyler as less
imperative than procedural justice, could play a different or even an enlarged role in
shaping police legitimacy under an authoritarian setting. (Sun et al. 2018: p. 2)
Drawing on data from a city-wide survey, Sun and colleagues conclude from their analysis that
these four judgements are so strongly bound up with legitimacy that they collectively
constitute the very construct itself. Rather than legitimacy being an overarching judgement
about the right to power and the authority to govern—that may or may not be influenced by
public judgements about whether police tend to act in procedurally just, distributively just,
effective and lawful ways, as is conceptualised in procedural justice theory (Sunshine and
Tyler 2003; Tyler 2006a, 2006b)—legitimacy is perceived procedural justice, perceived
distributive justice, perceived effectiveness and perceived lawfulness.
Their paper raises important questions regarding the role that context plays in police–citizen
relations, the conceptualisation and measurement of legitimacy, the difference between legit-
imacy and legitimation, and the position the researcher plays in (a) allowing the preconditions
of legitimacy (the criteria that people use to judge legitimacy) to be an empirical question (i.e.
discovered bottom-up) or (b) imposing the preconditions of legitimacy onto a given political
community top-down. Their study also speaks to a broader issue of blurring the normative
concept of legitimacy (the domain of the political philosopher, whose goal it is to consider
from outside a given system what constitutes the ethical use of political power) with the
empirical concept of legitimacy (the domain of the social scientist, whose goal it is to
understand how people subject to power structures judge the rightfulness of authority).
Our goals in this paper are twofold. First, while we think that Sun et al.’s (2018) study
makes a notable contribution to the literature, we question whether the analytical strategy they
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use actually achieves what it is supposed to achieve. The statistical model they use is not a
good adjudication tool because, we argue, the two conceptual stances under investigation in
Sun et al. (2018)—(a) procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness are
possible sources of legitimacy and (b) procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and
lawfulness are constituent components of legitimacy—are both consistent with the same fitted
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model. We take the researcher through a thought experi-
ment designed to illustrate the point that CFA is not fit for purpose because it cannot support
the claim made by Sun and colleagues that ‘procedural justice variables should be considered
as indicators of, rather than antecedents, of legitimacy’ (p. 14). We show that CFA is not a test
one way or the other, for the simple reason that one would get exactly the same results
whatever one calls the collection of constructs.
Second (and relatedly), we argue that their approach lacks cultural sensitivity because it is
the outside experts, here Ivan Sun and colleagues, who are imposing the criteria that people use
to judge institutional legitimacy. It is important not to conflate legitimacy and legitimation, we
contend, and we counsel against a trend starting in criminology where researchers apply the
approach of Sun et al. (2018) and Tankebe (2013) in new contexts, find that procedural justice,
distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness are empirically distinct and positively corre-
lated, and mistakenly interpret a successful fitted CFA model as evidence for the discovery that
legitimacy is procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness. Indeed, our
analysis of a 30-country dataset suggests that such an approach will be ‘successful’ wherever
one looks. We find that in each country analysed the same fitted CFA model properties (as
found in Sun et al. 2018) for comparable measures, yet this does not mean that legitimacy is so
constituted in any particular context. It just means that the constructs are distinct and positively
correlated, and that the measures have good scaling properties (it seems that we, as a
community of criminologists, have good measures of these constructs and they are empirically
distinct in most places we end up looking).
Researchers are, of course, free to impose onto a given context the criteria that people use to
judge the legitimacy of the police. When one measures police legitimacy using survey
indicators of procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness, one is doing
just that—one is taking a normative position that procedural justice, distributive justice,
effectiveness and lawfulness are so important that they collectively constitute the judgement
itself. Our point is, however, that CFA does not do what Sun et al. (2018: p. 14) claim that it
does. CFA cannot adjudicate between whether procedural justice, distributive justice, effec-
tiveness and lawfulness are ‘indicators, rather than antecedents, of legitimacy’. Consequently,
the approach of Sun et al. (2018) dictates the normative requirements of legitimacy under the
smokescreen of (non-existent) empirical evidence.
The paper proceeds as follows. By way of conceptual ground-clearing, we distinguish
between the normative concept of legitimacy of political philosophers and the empirical
concept of legitimacy of social scientists. After summarising the standard approach to
studying empirical police legitimacy, we review the original work of Tankebe (2013) who
Sun and colleagues sought to replicate. We then discuss Sun et al.’s (2018) approach.
Following the findings from our own empirical study into the measurement of legitimacy in
30 countries (that suggests that the measures of procedural justice, distributive justice,
effectiveness and lawfulness scale reasonably well wherever one looks), we conclude with
the idea that researchers who use CFA should be cognizant about what it can and cannot say
about construct validity and, more broadly, that researchers should not unwittingly conflate
legitimacy with potential legitimation.
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Normative and Empirical Legitimacy
Political philosophers often employ legitimacy as a normatively laden term to describe whether
state institutions meet an inherently value-based set of substantive criteria that specify how
institutions ought to be configured and behave if their power is to be judged as rightfully held.
In the case of the criminal justice system, a Western democratic conception of normative
legitimacy might involve a group of outside experts coming together to decide that institutions
should be judged according to principles of independence, transparency, accountability and
other features of the rule of law. To take a measure of normative legitimacy, these experts
might then collect national indicators of the rule of law.
By contrast, social scientists employ legitimacy as an empirically laden concept to describe
whether—as a matter of fact—those that are subject to authority confer legitimacy on that
authority (Tyler 2006a, 2006b; Caldeira and Gibson 1995; Gibson et al. 2003; Justice and
Meares 2014; Meares 2017; Hamm et al. 2017; Trinkner et al. 2018). The empirical concept of
legitimacy focuses on whether an institution finds ‘the approval of those who have to abide by
it’ (Hinsch 2010: p. 40). Legitimacy is premised on a fundamental accord between rulers and
ruled (Filiangeiri 1783–88, in Pardo 2000: p. 5) that is founded in shared norms and values and
established via the ‘moral performance’ (Liebling 2004) of power-holders.
Social scientists typically operationalise police legitimacy along two connected lines:
1. Normative justifiability of power in the eyes of citizens (the right to rule): do citizens
believe that the police as an institution is just, proper and appropriate?
2. Recognition of rightful authority (the authority to govern): do citizens believe that police
officers are entitled to be obeyed?
On this account, empirical legitimacy is a process that involves acceptance (or rejection) of the
implicit and explicit claims that police make to be legitimate. On the one hand, people judge the
legitimacy of the police as an institution against the societal norms that dictate what appropriate
conduct is (e.g. do police officers make neutral and objective decisions when dealing with
citizens?). On the other hand, the content of legitimation (i.e. the bases on which legitimacy is
justified or contested) is an empirical question—i.e. the content is not assumed by an outside
expert on the basis of political, moral, legal, religious or some other philosophy. Indeed, what
citizens of a particular social, political or legal context deem to be legitimising or deligitimising
police conduct may vary from one country to another. For example, people in one context might
judge the legitimacy of the police most keenly on the extent to which officers respect principles of
fair process, while effectiveness might be more important in a different context.
The Standard Approach to Studying Empirical Legitimacy
When studying empirical legitimacy (what Tyler (2017), calls ‘popular legitimacy’), re-
searchers (a) operationalise legitimacy as a psychological construct, (b) treat the normative
appropriateness part of the legitimacy construct as an overarching judgement, and (c) allow the
criteria that people use to judge legitimacy (i.e. type(s) of police conduct that shape people’s
legitimacy beliefs) to be an empirical question (e.g. Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2006a,
2006b). This strategy depends on distinguishing between potential sources of legitimacy (how
officers are perceived to act) and overarching legitimacy judgements (whether the institution
that these officers represent is deemed to have the right to power and authority to govern).
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Because of the abstract nature of legitimacy, researchers tend to measure legitimacy by
asking research participants whether authority is exercised appropriately (Tyler & Fagan,
2008; Jackson et al. 2013; Tyler and Jackson 2014). To avoid imposing the specific criteria
that people use to judge appropriate police conduct, measures are worded generally in ways
like ‘the police usually act in ways that are consistent with your sense of right and wrong’ and
‘the police generally have the same sense of right and wrong as I do’. Statistical analysis is
then used to assess whether, for instance, procedural justice and effectiveness judgements are
important predictors of legitimacy. If procedural justice judgements (do officers act in proce-
durally fair ways?) and effectiveness judgements (do officers act in effective ways?) explain
significant variation in legitimacy, then the inference is that these are two sources of legitimacy,
i.e. for authority to be appropriately exercised, then it needs to be employed in part in
procedurally fair and effective ways.
In a recent example of this approach, Huq et al. (2017) analysed data from a nationally
representative sample survey of the UK that measured the following constructs:
1. Public attitudes towards whether officers act in procedurally just ways;
2. Public attitudes towards whether officers act in distributively just ways;
3. Public attitudes towards whether officers act in effective ways;
4. Public attitudes towards whether officers respect the limits of their rightful authority;
5. Public attitudes towards whether officers use appropriate surveillance powers;
6. Perceived institutional legitimacy: normative alignment; and,
7. Perceived institutional legitimacy: duty to obey.
Huq and colleagues first used confirmatory factor analysis to assess whether the seven constructs
(five being labelled as possible sources of legitimacy and two being labelled as constituent
components of legitimacy, as specified by procedural justice theory) are empirically distinct
albeit positively correlated constructs (this is an important first stage of analysis that we will
return to later in the paper). Then having found evidence for empirical distinctiveness—and
having found good scaling properties for the indicators of each construct—they used structural
equation modelling to assess the extent to which each of the first five constructs (treated as
possible sources of legitimacy) predicted normative alignment and duty to obey (treated as
constituent components of legitimacy). Figure 1 provides an overview of the model.
Huq et al. (2017) found (a) that procedural justice and bounded authority were predictors of
normative alignment and (b) that normative alignment and effectiveness were predictors of
duty to obey. The conclusion they drew from this was that police legitimacy (operationalised
as judgements of normative appropriateness) in the UK may be judged most strongly on the
basis on which officers are seen to act in procedurally just ways and to respect the limits of
their rightful authority. In other words, citizens seemed to judge institutional legitimacy of the
police in part on whether officers respect the limits of their rightful authority, treat people with
respect and dignity, talk and listen to people, and act in unbiased, transparent and accountable
ways. In turn, normative alignment and police effectiveness were both predictors of willing
consent to rightful authority, suggesting that duty to obey is linked to some degree with a
popular sense of police strength in the fight against crime.
A majority of studies using this approach have found that the most important predictor of
legitimacy is the extent to which people think that officers act in procedurally just ways—more
important than for example perceptions of the effectiveness of the police in reducing crime and
responding to victims. This is the case in the USA (Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Reisig et al.
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2007; White et al. 2016), UK (Huq et al. 2011; Bradford 2014), Australia (Murphy and
Cherney 2012; Murphy et al. 2016, 2018), Israel (Mentovich et al. 2018), China (Sun et al.
2017) and Continental Europe (Hough et al. 2013a, 2013b; Dirikx and Van den Bulck 2013).
Procedurally just police conduct seems to act as a legitimating process of justification, while
procedurally unjust police conduct seems to act as a delegitimating process of contestation
(Tyler 2017). Notably, however, effectiveness and lawfulness judgements do seem to play a
more important role in predicting empirical legitimacy in Pakistan and South Africa (Jackson
et al. 2014; Bradford et al. 2014a, 2014b). In the latter cases, it may be that judgements about
fair process can to some degree be crowded out by concerns about police (in)effectiveness and
corruption, the sheer scale of the crime problem and/or the association of the police with a
historically oppressive and underperforming state.
Police Legitimacy and Public Cooperation in Southern China
What, then, of Sun et al.’s (2018) study? Rather than using the approach outlined above, Sun
and colleagues replicated Tankebe’s (2013) empirical strategy, which sought to adjudicate
between the following two conceptual stances:
1. Procedural justice, effectiveness, distributive justice and lawfulness are possible sources of
legitimacy (where one then uses statistical modelling to determine the empirical
importance of each one in explaining variation in the perceived right to power, see e.g.
Huq et al. 2017); or,
Possible sources of legitimacy
EF
NA
DO
DJ
BA
SP
PJ
Constituent components
of legitimacy
Fig. 1 Testing the possible sources of legitimacy. PJ = procedural justice; DJ = distributive justice; EFF =
effectiveness; BA= bounded authority; SP = surveillance practices; NA = normative alignment; DO = duty to
obey. CFA indicated that the seven constructs were empirically distinct and positively correlated, and that the
various sets of multiple indicators had good scaling properties.
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2. Procedural justice, effectiveness, distributive justice and lawfulness are constituent com-
ponents of legitimacy (where they are so important that they collectively constitute the
perceived right to power).
The details of the methodology used to adjudicate between these two positions are central to
the current commentary. Because Sun et al. (2018) tried to replicate Tankebe’s (2013) London-
based study, we review the original study first, before turning to Sun et al. (2018).
Tankebe (2013) drew upon data from a survey of Londoners (cf. Jackson et al. 2013a,
2013b) that measured among other things people’s perceptions of police procedural justice,
distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness (using multiple indicators of each). He
defined these as constituent components of legitimacy, and not possible sources of legitimacy.
He found that a four-factor model that distinguished between the four constructs fitted the data
reasonably well (summarised in Fig. 2); so, given the constraints in the fitted CFA model—i.e.
no cross-loadings or error covariances and conditional independence of items given the four
latent factors—one can treat these four judgments as distinct, albeit correlated, latent
constructs.
Tankebe (2013) then tested whether effectiveness should be treated as a possible source of
legitimacy or a constituent component of legitimacy. He fitted a three-factor CFA model
without the effectiveness indicators and the effectiveness latent variable (i.e. he dropped EF1–
EF7 and the EF latent variable in Fig. 2). He showed that the three-factor model fitted the data
PJ
EF
DJ
LF
PJ1
PJ2
PJ3
PJ4
EF4
EF5
EF6
EF7
DJ1
LF1
LF2
DJ2
.78
.79
.77
.76
.75
.80
.76
.77
PJ5
EF1
EF2
EF3
.31
.74
.69
.75
.71
.75
.70
.60
.24
.89
.86 .27
.14
.84
Constituent 
components of 
legitimacy
Fig. 2 Tankebe’s (2013) measure-
ment model of legitimacy. Source:
Tankebe (2013). Viewing things
differently: The dimensions of
public perceptions of legitimacy.
Criminology, 51, pp. 103–135.
PJ = procedural justice; EF = ef-
fectiveness; DJ = distributive jus-
tice; LF = lawfulness. Fit statistics:
X2 = 1056, df = 98, p = < .005;
CFI = .970; RMSEA= .044 (95%
CI .041–.046). The model fitted
the data reasonably well and the
measures had good scaling prop-
erties. For Tankebe (2013), this
constitutes evidence that what is
being measured here must be
‘constituent components of legiti-
macy’, and not ‘possible sources of
legitimacy’
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reasonably well. He ran a chi-square difference test to compare the relative fit of the three-
factor and four-factor models. Finding that both the three-factor model (when indicators of
procedural fairness, distributive fairness and lawfulness were included) and the four-factor
model (when indicators of effectiveness, procedural fairness, distributive fairness and lawful-
ness were included) both fitted the data reasonably well, he deduced that:
Effectiveness has to be viewed as a component of legitimacy; police organizations that
seek legitimacy must demonstrate effectiveness as a normative requirement. Coicaud…
has put this well: BEvery political ruler who seeks to prove he possesses the right to
govern [that is, is legitimate] has to satisfy, to try to satisfy, or to pretend to satisfy the
needs of the members of the community.^ For the police, those needs include safety and
security. (Tankebe 2013, p. 121)
Tankebe’s (2013) reasoning was as follows. If the four-factor CFA model (Fig. 1) fitted the
data reasonably well, then these four constructs should be labelled constituent components of
legitimacy and not possible sources of legitimacy. The fact that the items scaled well, the fact
that the analysis supported the idea that there were four underlying dimensions to the data, and
the fact that these four factors were strongly and positively correlated (and that including
effectiveness did not decrease the fit of the model) all meant that legitimacy is procedural
justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness.
Overall, the findings suggest that what police researchers have persistently tended to use
as predictors of legitimacy (procedural fairness, distributive fairness, lawfulness, and
effectiveness) are rather the constituent parts of legitimacy … The results of the
confirmatory factor analysis presented in this study suggest that the debate [about
whether legitimacy causes procedural justice or procedural justice causes legitimacy]
might be redundant because procedural fairness is a constituent part of legitimacy rather
than something apart from it. (Tankebe 2013, p. 125)
In a replication study, Sun et al. (2018) motivated their empirical strategy by claiming that the
approach of Tankebe (2013) offers a greater level of cultural sensitivity than the traditional
approach to measuring and modelling legitimacy (e.g. Huq et al. 2017):
Drawing upon the dialog conception of legitimacy which views legitimacy Bas always
dialogic and relational in character^ (Bottoms and Tankebe 2012, p. 129), Tankebe
emphasized the dynamic nature embedded in police-citizen encounters, arguing that the
different dimensions of legitimacy tend to have different effects across societies and among
social groups within the same society. It is with this same embracement of cultural diversity
that we attempt to test Tankebe’s work in the Chinese context. (Sun et al. 2018: p. 5)
To test the idea that the legitimation of the police is more complex in China than it is in contexts
like the US, UK and Australia (where procedural justice is the key predictor of legitimacy), they
examined whether Tankebe’s (2013) approach to measurement ‘worked’ in this city in Southern
China. Like Tankebe (2013), they a priori defined legitimacy as procedural justice, distributive
justice, effectiveness and lawfulness. Like Tankebe (2013), they used confirmatory factor analysis
to test a four-factor model, although this time they included a second-order factor that they labelled
legitimacy. This meant testing the idea that the second-order factor explained the correlations
between procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness (specifically that the
bivariate correlations can be modelled according to one underlying latent construct). Of note is the
fact that Sun and colleagues could just as reasonably tested amodel with two or three second-order
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factors, since there is no requirement in the literature for legitimacy to be unidimensional (for
discussion, see Jackson and Gau 2015).
Sun et al. (2018) found that the model (reproduced in Fig. 3) fitted the data reasonably well,
with (i) good scaling properties for each of the four sets of indicators, (ii) four factors that were
strongly and positively correlated and (iii) a second-order factor linked to each of the four first-
order factors. Following the line of reasoning of Tankebe (2013) (see also Tankebe et al.
(2016)), they interpreted the findings as follows:
…the convergent validity, discriminant validity, and internal consistency of all key
measures were supported in the CFA analysis and the reliability tests…Substantively,
these results mean two things: (1) procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness,
and lawfulness are four distinct sub-constructs of legitimacy, and each sub-construct is
well explained by its own corresponding observed variables, rather than by variables
from a different sub-construct, and (2) the four sub-constructs correlate well with one
another within their latent construct legitimacy. In short, Tankebe’s argument that
procedural justice variables should be considered as indicators, rather than antecedents,
of legitimacy, is supported. (Sun et al. 2018: p. 14).
It seems, then, that we have empirical evidence on what police legitimacy is (at least in the
context of London and this unnamed city in Southern China). Legitimacy is not some overarching
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Fig. 3 Sun et al.’s (2018) measurement model of legitimacy. Source: Sun et al. (2018). Police legitimacy and
citizen cooperation in China: testing an alternative model. Asian Journal of Criminology, 13(4), pp. 275–291.
LG= legitimacy; PJ = procedural justice; EF = effectiveness; DJ = distributive justice; LF = lawfulness. Fit sta-
tistics: X2 = 206, df = 50, p = <.005; CFI = .982; TLI = .976; RMSEA= .058; and SRMR= .030. Because this
model fitted the data reasonably well and because the measures had good scaling properties, Sun et al. (2018)
argued that the second-order factor must be labelled ‘constituent components of legitimacy’ and not ‘possible
sources of legitimacy’
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judgement about the normative appropriateness of the police, coupled with a felt moral duty to obey
legal authorities, as specified by Sunshine and Tyler (2003), Tyler (2006a, 2006b), Huq et al. (2017)
and others. Legitimacy may not be predicted more strongly by procedural justice than by distrib-
utive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness, as is typically found in extant work. Strikingly, the CFA
modelling in Tankebe (2013) and Sun et al. (2018) seems to show that legitimacy is procedural
justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness. It follows that if the police are to be judged
to be legitimate in the current two contexts (see also Tankebe et al.’s 2016 work in the US and
Ghana), then police officers need to be seen by citizens to act in ways that are (a) procedurally just,
(b) distributively just, (c) effective and (d) lawful (to, one assumes, a roughly equal extent). In other
words, police should prioritise visibly acting in procedurally just, distributively just, effective and
lawful ways if they are to be seen as legitimate by those they protect and serve.
Normative or Empirical Concepts of Legitimacy?
Their paper was so thought-provoking that we asked Sun and colleagues if they could share
the data. Given the fundamental importance of the finding regarding measurement, we were
especially interested in the CFA modelling. Yet, while the dataset was not forthcoming, it
turned out that we did not need it—and this only underlines the point we would like to make.
To explain, imagine you are embarking on a new study into police legitimacy in a coastal
city in South China. You begin with the received wisdom on the nature of legitimacy. Sun et al.
(2018) established that the residents of this coastal Chinese city judge the legitimacy of the
police on the (roughly equal) bases of procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and
lawfulness. This key piece of work treated legitimacy as the joint distribution of these four
constituent parts (i.e. legitimacy was represented as a second-order latent variable); legitimacy
predicted cooperation; and the statistical effect was partly mediated by obligation to obey,
which was treated as a potential outcome rather than constituent part of legitimacy (note that
this second part of the study does not concern us here).
You are interested in questioning the status quo established by Sun et al. (2018). You want
to test a measurement model that (a) operationalises legitimacy as a general belief that the
police are morally entitled to dictate appropriate behaviour (i.e. as obligation to obey, see Tyler
and Jackson 2013), (b) treats procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawful-
ness as possible sources of legitimacy, which means (c) that it is an empirical question whether
citizens of this coastal Chinese city judge the right of the police to dictate appropriate
behaviour (i.e. obligation to obey) on the basis of the procedural justice and/or distributive
justice and/or effectiveness and/or lawfulness displayed by police officers (using the sort of
statistical analysis employed by Huq et al. 2017, Sunshine and Tyler 2003, and others).
Mirroring the reasoning of Tankebe, Sun and others, you start with a conceptual stance that
procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness are possible sources of
legitimacy. You obtain Sun et al.’s (2018) data, you fit a confirmatory factor model to test
whether your challenge to the standard practice (i.e. Sun et al. 2018) is correct, and you obtain
the results summarised in Fig. 4. You find that the measures of the four constructs (a) scale
well, (b) can be represented as four latent variables, (c) are strongly and positively correlated
and (d) that these correlations between the latent variables can be modelled according to a
second-order factor.
Crucially, having a priori labelled the second-order factor ‘possible sources of legitimacy’, you
argue that the finding constitutes empirical proof that they are possible sources of legitimacy and
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not constituent components of legitimacy. Note that this follows the line of reasoning of Tankebe
(2013) and Sun et al. (2018). The fact that the model fits means that you were right to define
procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness as possible sources of legit-
imacy (rather than constituent components of legitimacy). Having claimed that the finding
overturns current thinking in this coastal Chinese city, you then move on to test one of two
models linking the potential predictors of legitimacy to obligation to obey (Fig. 5).
Yet, imagine , for one moment, pausing to reflect. Tankebe (2013) and Sun et al. (2018)
began by noting the status quo: namely, that procedural justice, distributive justice, effective-
ness and lawfulness are possible sources of legitimacy (with regression modelling indicating
the most important culturally contingent criteria). They then claimed that the findings from
their CFA modelling showed that these four constructs were, in fact, constituent components of
legitimacy. By arguing that the fitted CFA models in Figs. 2 and 3 were incompatible with the
idea that the constructs were possible sources of legitimacy, they overturned the status quo. In
the words of Sun et al. (2018: p. 14), procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and
lawfulness are ‘indicators, rather than antecedents of legitimacy’.
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Fig. 4 An alternative measurement model of legitimacy. Source: Sun, I. Y., Li, L., Wu, Y., and Hu, R. (2018).
Police legitimacy and citizen cooperation in China: testing an alternative model. Asian Journal of Criminology,
13(4), pp. 275–291. PSL = possible sources of legitimacy; PJ = procedural justice; EF = effectiveness; DJ =
distributive justice; LF = lawfulness. Fit statistics: X2 = 206, df = 50, p = <.005; CFI = .982; TLI = .976;
RMSEA= .058; and SRMR= .030. Because this model fitted the data reasonably well and because the measures
had good scaling properties, you argue that the second-order factor must be labelled ‘possible sources of
legitimacy’ and not ‘constituent components of legitimacy’
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You are doing the opposite. You start with their status quo, i.e. that procedural justice,
distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness are constituent components of legitimacy
(Sun et al. 2018). Your CFA modelling shows good convergence validity, discriminant validity
and internal consistency (to paraphrase Sun et al. 2018, p. 14). You find that a second-order
factor (that you a priori labelled ‘possible sources of legitimacy’) model fitted the data. So, you
argue that what have previously been treated as constituent components of legitimacy are in
fact possible sources of legitimacy. You conclude, in other words, that you were correct in the
first place in how you labelled the constructs, and that Sun et al. (2018) were incorrect in the
first place when they labelled the constructs.
Yet, it is plainly apparent that Figs. 3 and 4 are identical, apart from the label given to the
second-order factor. Tankebe (2013) viewed the fitted model (Fig. 2) to be incompatible with
the notion that they are possible sources of legitimacy (as they are labelled in Huq et al. 2017;
see Fig. 1). But if both conceptual bases are consistent with the data, how can CFA provide
empirical evidence on which of the two competing conceptual stances is ‘correct’? In Sun
et al.’s (2018) study, the model fits the data reasonably well, regardless of what label we assign
to the second-order factor.
CFA is good at modelling correlations between variables according to some hypothesised latent
structures; it is less adept at telling uswhat to label a collection of constructs.Whether one calls these
constructs possible sources of legitimacy or constituent components of legitimacy depends on one’s
conceptual stance. Indeed, to believe that CFA constitutes a test of the conceptual status of the
constructs, onewould have to reify latent variables in a quite unusual way. Onewould have to name
PSL
L
LG
CP
PJ
EF
DJ
LF
LG
CP
EF
DJ
LF
PJ
Fig. 5 Two theoretical models of possible sources of legitimacy, legitimacy and cooperation. PSL = possible
sources of legitimacy; LG= legitimacy (measured using indicators of felt obligation to obey the police); CP =
willingness to cooperate with the police
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the second-order factor before fitting the model, then interpret the fact that a second-order factor
model fits the data as empirical proof that one was right to name the second-order factor in the way
that you did, prior to doing the analysis. Yet, the fittedmodel produces the same results whatever we
call the second-order factor. So, why is it a test one way or the other?
Indeed, it is difficult to know what would have to be present in a fitted CFA model if the
empirical test described above (testing whether procedural justice, distributive justice, effec-
tiveness and lawfulness are constituent components of legitimacy) was to be deemed to fail. In
Tankebe’s (2013) analysis, it seems that if the fit of the model was reduced by adding
effectiveness, then this proves that the police do not have to be seen to act effectively if they
are to be seen as legitimate by citizens. But why would that follow? A less well fitting model
would more likely indicate that there are cross-loadings and/or error covariances that should be
added, not that one is wrong to label a collection of constructs in a particular way. In Sun
et al.’s (2018) analysis, it could be that a single second-order factor would not fit the data, but
why would finding that one needs multiple second-order factors to explain why procedural
justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness are correlated somehow ‘prove’ that
procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness are not potential sources of
legitimacy? There is no requirement that legitimacy is unidimensional.
Testing the Cultural (In)Sensitivity of This Approach to Measurement:
a 30-Country Study
So far in this paper we have discussed what latent variable modelling can and cannot say about
an issue of construct validity that is ultimately down to conceptual analysis and operational
argumentation. In the second part, we turn to the idea that the measures of procedural justice,
distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness are likely to scale well in most places one looks
at; that if one (wrongly) interprets good scaling properties as evidence that these constructs are
constituent components rather than possible sources of legitimacy, then one would (wrongly)
conclude that legitimacy is procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness
in most places one looks at; and that the approach lacks cultural sensitivity because it would end
up asserting, without credible empirical evidence, that the normative preconditions of legiti-
macy are exactly the same in nearly all the places one looks at.
To reflect on the issue of cultural sensitivity, we apply the approach to 30 different countries.
Our goal is to test whether the CFAmodel of Tankebe (2013) is likely to fit wherever one looks
for two reasons: (a) we as a community of criminologists have good measures of these four
constructs and (b) in most contexts the constructs are likely to be empirically distinct but
positively correlated. Using the same approach to measuring and modelling legitimacy as
Tankebe (2013), we fit the sameCFAmodel in each country separately.We distinguish between
procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness (Fig. 6), and following
Tankebe (2013), we call these constituent components of legitimacy.
Data
The ESS is an academically driven face-to-face interview survey that runs every 2 years. Charting
a range of attitudes, values, behaviours and beliefs between nations and over time, it is one of the
highest quality—if not the highest quality—cross-national surveys in the world, especially in
terms of sampling and measurement equivalence. It employs a rigorous questionnaire translation,
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pretesting and development methodology (Jowell et al. 2007). Although not all countries achieve
it, the aspiration is that countries should have probability samples of the adult (16+) population,
with high response rates, interviewed face-to-face using CAPI (computer-assisted personal
interviewing). The questionnaire comprises an invariant core of questions asked of all respondents
in each round. Also included in some rounds are rotating modules that focus in detail on a
particular issue. Academics are invited to bid for space on the questionnaire in each round.
In Round 5, a module on trust in justice containing 45 questions was included (European
Social Survey 2011; Jackson et al. 2011; Hough et al. 2013a). Fieldwork for Round 5 of the
ESS was done in 2010/2011 (European Social Survey, 2010, 2018). A total of 28 countries
took part, some of which were European in only a loose sense: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federa-
tion, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and Ukraine. The probability
samples are representative of all persons aged 15 and older, and residents within the borders
of the nation, regardless of nationality, citizenship, language or legal status. The smallest
sample size was 1083 in Cyprus and the largest sample size was 3031 in Germany.
The US data come from an internet-based survey fielded to a random selection of
individuals drawn from a GFK Knowledge Networks research panel of U.S. adults (Tyler
and Jackson 2014; Tyler et al. 2015). Knowledge Networks uses random digit dialling and
address-based sampling methods to construct and maintain the panel. A total of 2561
respondents were initially selected from the larger panel. The study was described, an offer
of compensation extended and a reminder email was sent to all people on the list who had not
responded after 3 days. The survey was fielded in August and September of 2012, either in
English or in Spanish. A total of 1603 individuals completed the survey, representing a
response rate of 62.5% from the existing internet panel.
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Fig. 6 Posited measurement
model of potential sources of
legitimacy. PJ = procedural justice;
EF = effectiveness; DJ =
distributive justice; LF =
lawfulness
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The South Africa data come from the 2012 round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey
(SASAS), a repeated cross-sectional survey conducted annually by the Human Sciences Research
Council. The survey round consisted of a nationally representative probability sample of 3183
South African adults aged 16 years and over living in private households. Each SASAS round of
interviewing consists of a sub-sample of 500 Population Census enumeration areas (EAs),
stratified by province, geographical sub-type and majority population group. The SASAS aims
to provide a long-term account of change in public values and the social fabric of modern South
Africa. Given the importance of issues of crime and policing in South African society, permission
was secured to field police-related questions from the trust in justice module included in the fifth
round of the European Social Survey in 2010/2011 (see Bradford et al. 2014a, 2014b).
Measures
Procedural justice was measured by asking respondents how often (from 1 ‘not at all often’ to
4 ‘very often’) they think that officers in their country:
& Treat people with respect;
& Make fair and impartial decisions; and,
& Explain their decisions and actions when asked.
Police effectiveness was measured by asking respondents: ‘Based on what you have heard or
your own experience, how successful do you think the police in this country are at…^ (on a
scale from 0 to 10):
& Preventing crimes where violence is used or threatened;
& Catching people who commit house burglaries; and,
& How slowly or quickly police would arrive at the scene if a violent crime were to occur
near your house.
Distributive justice was measured using two questions. The introduction was: ‘Now some
questions about whether or not the police in [country] treat victims of crime equally. Please answer
based on what you have heard or your own experience.’ The first question was: ‘When victims
report crimes, do you think the police treat rich people worse, poor people worse, or are rich and
poor treated equally?’ The second question was: ‘when victims report crimes, do you think the
police treat some people worse because of their race or ethnic group or is everyone treated
equally?’ These two indicators were combined to form a single variable, with 0 equalling ‘neither
poor nor minority group members are treated worse’, 1 equalling ‘either poor or minority group
members are treated worse’ and 2 equalling ‘both poor and minority group members are treated
worse’. Finally, lawfulness was measured by asking people (a) to agree or disagree with the
statement ‘Decisions and actions of police are unduly influenced by political pressure’ on a 5-point
Likert scale and (b) ‘Howoften do police [in your country] take bribes’ on a scale from 0 ‘never’ to
10 ‘always’. These two variables were rescaled, such that high scores equal the belief that the
police act lawfully. A single index was created by taking the mean of the two variables (having
divided the bribery variable by 2 to put it on a comparable scale to the political pressure variable).
Note that a strength of the data is that the same measures were fielded in nationally
representative sample surveys of 30 countries. A weakness is that the measures of distributive
justice and lawfulness were limited to two each. Themeasures of distributive justice were nominal
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with three categories each, and the measures of lawfulness were one five-category variable and
one ten-category variable. As such, it makes sense to produce a single derived variable for
distributive justice and a single derived variable for lawfulness. In the context of confirmatory
factor analysis, this means we cannot test a model exactly like Tankebe’s (2013). But it is close
enough because the CFA is still assessing, among other things, whether these are four empirically
distinct constructs (Fig. 6). By close enough, we mean that whether one (a) has three indicators of
distributive justice, three indicators of lawfulness and models each as a latent variable or (b) has
two indicators of distributive justice, two indicators of lawfulness, and combines each to create a
manifest variable will make only a little difference to the fit statistics (improving them a little bit
because there are fewer constraints in the model to test) and this should make only a marginal
difference in the context of what we are trying to test here. More important is the extent to which
the four constructs are empirically distinct and positively correlated.
Note, also, that we do not fit a second-order factor. The extra testable assumption at the
heart of a second-order factor is unnecessary; it involves testing whether the correlations
between the four latent constructs can be modelled according to a single underlying second-
order latent construct, but as detailed above, if one finds that the second-order factor model fits,
why would this increase one’s confidence that the four constructs are constituent components
of legitimacy rather than possible sources of legitimacy? Because the researcher is free to call
the second-order factor whatever she likes? Equally, Sun et al. (2018) sought to replicate
Tankebe (2013) and he presented legitimacy as multidimensional and did not fit a second-
order factor, so ours is a more direct replication in that sense.
Results
Table 1 provides the exact and approximate fit statistics CFAmodels estimated for each country
in the dataset (Fig. 6) that differentiates between procedural justice (a latent construct with three
indicators), effectiveness (another latent construct with three indicators), distributive justice (a
manifest indicator calculated using responses to two indicators) and lawfulness (another
manifest indicator calculated using responses to two indicators). We discount the exact fit
statistics because the chi-square test is extremely sensitive to sample size (very small deviations
in the match between the hypothesised and saturated models can be highlighted as statistically
significant). The approximate fit statistics are adequate in all countries (cf. Hu and Bentler
1998). The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) statistics are all close to the cut-
off point of .06; RMSEA is a parsimony-adjusted index, with values closer to 0 indicating a
good fit. The comparative fit index (CFI) statistics are all above .95; CFI compares the fit of the
model to the fit of a null model, with values closer to 1 indicating a good fit. The Tucker Lewis
Index (TLI) statistics are all close to the cut-off point of .95; TLI is an incremental measure of fit
that has a penalty for adding parameters, with values closer to 1 indicating a good fit.
Table 2 provides details of the scaling properties of procedural justice and effectiveness in
each country. Each cell gives the standardised factor loading (left) and R2 (right) for each
particular indicator (PJ1, PJ2, PJ3, EFF1, EFF2 and EFF3) in each of the 30 different
countries. For procedural justice, the standardised factor loadings range from .59 to .94, and
the R2’s range from .35 to .88. For effectiveness, the standardised factor loadings range from
.44 to .90, and the R2’s range from .20 to .80. Because the factor loadings and R2’s are all
relatively high, this indicates good scaling properties.
Table 3 provides the correlations between the four constructs. Looking across the 30
countries, the pair of constructs with the strongest correlation is procedural justice and
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effectiveness (ranges from .45 to .77) and the pair of constructs with the weakest correlation is
distributive justice and lawfulness (ranges from .06 to .42).
If we applied the reasoning of Tankebe (2013) and Sun et al. (2018) with respect to their CFA
modelling, we would interpret the fact that the four-factor model fitted the data in each of the 30
countries as evidence that what have been previously treated as possible sources of legitimacy
are, in fact, constituent components of legitimacy. This would imply that legitimacy rests on the
same normative bases (in the sense that people judge the legitimacy of the police using the same
defining criteria of appropriate police conduct) in all 30 countries. In each of these diverse
social, political and legal contexts, the police need to be seen to act in ways that are procedurally
just, distributively just, effective and lawful if they are to be deemed empirically legitimate.
Strikingly, this would contradict a good deal of existing research that (a) shows that procedural
justice is the most important criterion in many countries across the world, and (b) highlights some
interesting country-level differences in the extent towhich each of the four criteria explains variation
in legitimacy (see Jackson 2018, for a review of the international literature). Indeed, the claim here is
not that procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness are all strong predictors
of legitimacy in each country; the point is that they are so fundamental to the perceived right to
power that they collectively constitute it. We return to this point in the discussion below.
Table 1 Fit statistics for the fitted confirmatory factor analysis model in each of the 30 countries
Country Chi-square df p value RMSEA
95% CI
CFI TLI
Austria 149 16 < 0.001 .061 [.052, .070] .987 .978
Belgium 146 16 < 0.001 .069 [.059, .080] .956 .923
Bulgaria 110 16 < 0.001 .050 [.041, .059] .992 .986
Croatia 154 16 < 0.001 .073 [.063, .083] .973 .953
Cyprus 69 16 < 0.001 .055 [.042, .069] .991 .985
Czech Republic 157 16 < 0.001 .061 [.063, .070] .982 .968
Denmark 103 16 < 0.001 .059 [.048, .070] .968 .945
Estonia 91 16 < 0.001 .051 [.042, .062] .979 .963
Finland 78 16 < 0.001 .046 [.036, .056] .980 .965
France 120 16 < 0.001 .061 [.051, .072] .974 .954
Germany 143 16 < 0.001 .051 [.044, .059] .974 .955
Greece 99 16 < 0.001 .044 [.036, .052] .995 .991
Hungary 51 16 < 0.001 .038 [.026, .050] .989 .981
Ireland 142 16 < 0.001 .055 [.047, .064] .986 .975
Israel 184 16 < 0.001 .068 [.060, .077] .980 .965
Lithuania 74 16 < 0.001 .047 [.036, .058] .986 .976
Netherlands 129 16 < 0.001 .062 [.052, .072] .962 .933
Norway 131 16 < 0.001 .068 [.058, .079] .957 .924
Poland 83 16 < 0.001 .049 [.039, .060] .985 .974
Portugal 186 16 < 0.001 .070 [.061, .080] .973 .953
Russian Federation 174 16 < 0.001 .062 [.054, .071] .984 .971
Slovakia 139 16 < 0.001 .065 [.055, .075] .982 .969
Slovenia 93 16 < 0.001 .059 [.047, .071] .982 .968
South Africa 182 16 < 0.001 .065 [.056, .073] .986 .976
Spain 50 16 < 0.001 .033 [.023, .044] .994 .990
Sweden 101 16 < 0.001 .060 [.049, .071] .963 .935
Switzerland 70 16 < 0.001 .047 [.036, .059] .978 .962
Ukraine 95 16 < 0.001 .051 [.041, .061] .990 .982
UK 99 16 < 0.001 .046 [.038, .055] .988 .979
USA 96 16 < 0.001 .056 [.046, .067] .989 .981
Data: Round 5 European Social Survey, Yale Trust in Law Survey and SASAS 2010
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Discussion
We began this paper by describing how the empirical concept of legitimacy (Hinsch 2008) specifies
the right to power as a property of public opinion, e.g. people in Japan may view their police to be
more legitimate than people in the Russian Federation view their police, and if this is the case then
empirical legitimacy would be higher in Japan than in the Russian Federation. It also treats as an
empirical question the culturally contingent criteria that citizens of a given country use to judge the
legitimacy of the institution, e.g. people in Japanmay judge the legitimacy of the police according to
a different set of defining criteria of appropriate police conduct compared to people in the Russian
Federation (i.e. the norms that specify rightful police behaviour might be different in the two
countries). This is in contrast to the normative concept of legitimacy, which typically involves an
outsider observer determining the same substantive requirements for legitimacy in different contexts.
It could be, for example, that outside experts judge police legitimacy in both Japan and Russian
Federation according to the same system-level criteria, e.g. independence, accountability and other
indicators of the rule of law. To get a measure of normative legitimacy, these experts could collect
national-level indicators of institutional arrangements and practices defined according to these
criteria.
Table 2 Standardised factor loadings and R2s for the PJ and EFF indicators
Country PJ1 PJ2 PJ3 EFF1 EFF2 EFF3
Austria .88 / .77 .93 / .87 .72 / .52 .80 / .65 .78 / .61 .78 / .60
Belgium .78 / .61 .73 / .53 .65 / .42 .75 / .56 .70 / .49 .52 / .28
Bulgaria .90 / .81 .93 / .87 .80 / .63 .85 /.72 .79 / .63 .71 / .51
Croatia .84 / .71 .83 / .69 .78 / .60 .86 / .75 .83 / .69 .70 / .48
Cyprus .88 /.77 .93 / .86 .80 / .64 .83 / .69 .79 / .63 .75 / .56
Czech Republic .88 / .78 .88 / .77 .71 / .50 .78 / .61 .68 / .46 .70 / .50
Denmark .77 / .59 .80 / .64 .70 / .48 .77 / .59 .53 / .28 .56 / .31
Estonia .81 / .65 .81 / .65 .65 / .43 .70 / .49 .67 / .45 .61 / .37
Finland .74 / .55 .80 / .64 .65 / .43 .70 / .49 .70 / .49 .54 / .29
France .77 / .60 .84 / .70 .63 / .40 .77 / .59 .74 / .54 .63 / .39
Germany .74 / .55 .82 / .67 .59 / .35 .67 / .45 .66 / .43 .55 / .30
Greece .89 / .79 .94 / .88 .77 / .60 .86 / .74 .90 / .80 .81 / .66
Hungary .82 / .68 .87 / .75 .62 / .38 .80 / .64 .75 / .56 .57 / .33
Ireland .83 / .69 .91 / .82 .74 / .54 .80 / .63 .69 / .47 .66 / .43
Israel .86 / .74 .86 / .73 .80 / .63 .78 / .60 .68 / .47 .61 / .37
Lithuania .75 / .56 .83 / .68 .78 / .60 .83 / .69 .79 / .63 .64 / .41
Netherlands .78 / .61 .79 / .62 .62 / .39 .71 / .50 .64 / .41 .56 / .32
Norway .85 / .72 .68 / .47 .62 / .38 .73 / .53 .69 / .48 .62 / .39
Poland .81 / .66 .84 / .71 .76 / .58 .81 / .65 .78 / .61 .65 / .42
Portugal .77 / .60 .87 / .76 .79 / .62 .77 / .59 .78 / .61 .73 / .53
Russian Federation .84 / .70 .89 / .80 .77 / .59 .81 / .66 .80 / .64 .70 / .48
Slovakia .83 /. 69 .91 / .83 .76 / .58 .83 / .69 .79 / .62 .65 / .43
Slovenia .83 / .69 .92 / .85 .67 / .45 .80 / .63 .78 / .60 .62 / .38
South Africa .87 / .76 .91 / .83 .79 / .62 .83 / .69 .78 / .61 .80 / .64
Spain .84 / .71 .89 / .79 .70 / .49 .82 / .67 .76 / .57 .66 / .44
Sweden .70 / .48 .73 / .53 .70 / 49 .76 / .58 .70 / .50 .56 / .31
Switzerland .76 / .58 .76 / .58 .68 / .46 .74 / .55 .78 / .61 .44 / .20
Ukraine .83 / .69 .92 / .84 .84 / .70 .84 / .70 .84 / .70 .75 / .56
UK .86 / .73 .87 / .76 .70 / .49 .75 / .56 .71 / .50 .64 / .41
USA .92 / .84 .79 / .63 .84 / .70 .85 / .71 .73 / .53 .72 / .52
Data: Round 5 European Social Survey, Yale Trust in Law Survey and SASAS 2010
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We then described the methodology used by Sun et al. (2018) and Tankebe (2013) to test a
new approach to defining, measuring and modelling empirical legitimacy. In Sun et al.’s (2018)
study, the scales of procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness had
good measurement properties; they loaded on four strongly correlated latent variables; and
these four latent constructs were themselves regressed onto a single second-order factor (that the
researchers labelled legitimacy). The researchers subsequently argued that, on this evidence
base, they are such strong criteria that they can be treated as constituent components of
legitimacy. What have previously been treated as potential forms of legitimation—types of
normatively appropriate police conduct—are now reclassified as legitimacy beliefs themselves.
We then took the reader through a hypothetical reanalysis of Sun et al.’s (2018) data. Taking
a different starting point but following the same logical sequence, we reached the conclusion
that what has previously been viewed as four constituent components of legitimacy in this
coastal Chinese city are, in fact, possible sources of legitimacy. The scales of procedural
justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness had good measurement properties;
they loaded on four strongly correlated latent variables; and these four latent constructs were
themselves regressed onto a single second-order factor one a priori labelled ‘possible sources
of legitimacy’. This thought experiment illustrated the basic methodological point that the
findings of the CFA modelling do not tell whether one is right in the first place to define
Table 3 Correlations between constructs from the fitted measurement model
Country PJ with EFF PJ with DJ PJ with LF EFF with DJ EFF with LF DJ with LF
Austria .63 .54 .43 .47 .42 .42
Belgium .51 .32 .36 .23 .28 .19
Bulgaria .76 .49 .55 .47 .52 .42
Croatia .71 .54 .48 .49 .40 .32
Cyprus .70 .44 .52 .41 .46 .34
Czech Republic .70 .46 .53 .39 .39 .31
Denmark .58 .38 .27 .35 .25 .22
Estonia .67 .39 .47 .34 .41 .35
Finland .52 .32 .38 .27 .21 .25
France .64 .45 .40 .30 .38 .32
Germany .55 .35 .32 .36 .29 .28
Greece .77 .40 .56 .37 .49 .33
Hungary .65 .47 .51 .40 .38 .37
Ireland .68 .41 .43 .42 .39 .33
Israel .71 .40 .32 .38 .27 .19
Lithuania .69 .42 .45 .41 .36 .29
Netherlands .45 .38 .29 .26 .16 .19
Norway .53 .31 .31 .29 .16 .17
Poland .63 .46 .47 .41 .41 .37
Portugal .51 .41 .37 .44 .47 .34
Russian Federation .75 .42 .41 .40 .36 .25
Slovakia .64 .39 .45 .40 .42 .29
Slovenia .64 .43 .42 .43 .36 .36
South Africa .54 .43 .33 .41 .27 .24
Spain .68 .45 .45 .40 .41 .34
Sweden .55 .33 .29 .34 .09 .18
Switzerland .52 .36 .34 .30 .25 .29
Ukraine .69 .30 .31 .32 .25 .06
UK .62 .38 .35 .37 .33 .28
USA .67 .48 .61 .34 .49 .40
Data: Round 5 European Social Survey, Yale Trust in Law Survey and SASAS 2010
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procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness as (a) potential criteria that
people use to judge legitimacy or (b) constituent components of legitimacy. Put bluntly, CFA is
not a good adjudication tool because the same fitted model is consistent with both conceptual
stances; we get exactly the same findings whatever we call the collection of constructs. As a
result, we recommend that researchers do not use CFA in the same way as Tankebe (2013) and
Sun et al. (2018).
We then investigated whether the approach to defining, measuring and modelling police
legitimacy of Sun et al. (2018) and Tankebe (2013) ironically does the opposite of embracing
cultural diversity. By linking Round 5 of the European Social Survey (ESS) to two matching
representative sample surveys of the USA and South Africa, we produced a 30-country dataset
spanning a range of diverse contexts. Testing whether Tankebe’s (2013) four-factor model
fitted in each of the social, political and legal contexts, we found that the model (specified in
Fig. 6) fitted the data reasonably well in each and every case. In each and every country,
measures of procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness scaled rea-
sonably well; they reflected or formed four empirically distinct constructs; and they were
strongly and positively correlated with each other. Following the reasoning of Sun and
colleagues, this would imply that legitimacy is—in each and every one of those countries—
the same thing, i.e. constituted by public judgements of police procedural justice, distributive
justice, effectiveness and lawfulness. In Sun et al.’s (2018) view, the legitimating norms that
people expect police to abide by, before the institution is to be viewed as legitimate, would be
the same in all countries and relate to these four types of police behaviour.1
1 We should say that an anonymous referee asked whether it really matters whether criminologists define
procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness judgements as potential sources of legitimacy
or constituent components of legitimacy. To quote the referee: ‘The difference between possible sources of
legitimacy and constituent components of legitimacy might be real as the difference between the interval level
measurement and the ratio level of measurement, but criminology as a soft science does not care much about that
difference. We constantly treat ordinal measures as if they were interval/ratio.’ We are happy to clarify our
position. When criminologists study the legitimacy of the police, they tend to try to answer two questions. First,
what legitimates the police in the eyes of citizens, i.e. what types of police conduct legitimate or delegitimate the
institution in the eyes of the policed? Second, does legitimacy motivate public cooperation and compliance, i.e.
does legitimacy motivate people to comply with norms and rules? The first line of enquiry is central to the current
paper. Observational studies model the correlations between people’s contact with the police, their perceptions of
how officers generally act (do officers generally act in procedurally just, distributively just, effective and lawful
ways?) and legitimacy (overarching judgements of the institution’s right to power and authority to govern).
Experimental studies manipulate police behaviour and assess whether legitimacy is ‘moved around’ (e.g. Posch,
2019; Trinkner et al. 2019). Now, if we as a community of criminologists decide that it does not matter whether
procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness are potential sources of legitimacy or
constituent components of legitimacy, then that would shut down survey and experimental work into the criteria
that people use to judge the legitimacy of the police (at least in terms of procedural justice, distributive justice,
effectiveness and lawfulness). While the anonymous referee suggests that this may be fine, we respectfully
disagree. We think it is important to embrace cultural diversity in the criteria that people use to judge rightfulness.
Moreover, to make evidence-based policy recommendations on how the police should act to encourage
legitimacy, one needs empirical research. It may be that in the USA, UK and Australia, for instance, people
base their judgements of the legitimacy of the police as an institution to a significant extent on whether officers
act in procedurally fair ways, but in countries like South Africa and Pakistan the effectiveness of the police in
fighting crime is as least as important as procedural justice. If, as the anonymous referee seems to think, it is
really just semantics whether we define procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness as
possible sources of legitimacy or constituent components of legitimacy (as important as the ‘difference between
the interval level of measurement and the ratio level of measurement’), then it would be impossible to study
empirically what legitimates or delegitimates the police, and it would be difficult to draw empirically informed
policy recommendations. To do all this, one needs, by definition, to tease apart rather than conflate potential
predictors of legitimacy and constituent components of legitimacy.
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We believe this would be a misfounded view. The fact that the model fitted the data well in
each country says little about whether we are measuring, accurately or not, legitimacy. The
claim that we are doing so is a purely conceptual matter based on an a priori assumption about
what constitutes legitimacy in a particular context and how it can reasonably be operationalised.
Moreover, the approach would lead to what seems to us the rather odd conclusion that the
criteria citizens use to judge police legitimacy are exactly the same across all 30 countries
(indeed so strong that they collectively constitute the construct itself) based erroneously on the
fact that the measures had good scaling properties in each of the 30 countries.
If measures of procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness will
scale well wherever one looks, then one would end up saying that legitimacy is defined as
perceived procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness wherever one
looks. In practice, therefore, far from being sensitive to cultural variation in the composition of
legitimacy, the model proposed by Tankebe, Sun and colleagues flattens out the possibility of
variation. It imposes an Anglo-Saxon perspective under the smokescreen of empirical discov-
ery. We do notwant this mistake to catch on—and given publication bias, it is more likely to
catch on if the measurement model fits nearly everywhere we look.
There are three obvious problems with this. First, one could take a normative view that
police should act in procedurally just, distributively just, effective and lawful ways, and that
being seen to do so is so fundamental to their principled justification that their right to power
rests directly on public perceptions across these criteria. Irrespective of the criteria that citizens
actually use to judge legitimacy, this approach expounds the criteria that must be in place if the
police are to be seen as legitimate from a normative sense. It employs one aspect of the
normative concept of legitimacy—in that it is the outside expert (not the people in a given
society) who decides what needs to be present for the police to be deemed legitimate—and
fuses it to one aspect of the empirical concept of legitimacy, where legitimacy is defined as a
judgement that citizens make regarding the right to power and authority to govern. This may
be a reasonable position, albeit it is not to our own particular taste—we prefer to empirically
discover the culturally contingent criteria of legitimation that people in a particular political
community actually use. The problem lies, instead, with researchers claiming spurious empir-
ical evidence for what is ultimately a normative position. This is not a question of whether our
research should be theory-driven or data-driven (as one anonymous referee put it), it is a
methodological question about what sort of evidence CFA does and does not provide.
Second, and relatedly, when using the approach to defining, measuring and modelling
police legitimacy of Sun et al. (2018), there is little or no possibility of assessing which, if any,
is the most important component of legitimacy. What type or aspect of behaviour is most
important in generating a sense that that police activity is normatively justifiable? Do people
value procedural justice most? Or are they more concerned with effectiveness? These seem to
us important questions, both theoretically and from a policy perspective. Answers to these
questions may vary across different cultural contexts, yet the approach to measuring legitimacy
taken in Sun et al. (2018) makes it difficult if not impossible to answer them. If one defined the
four constructs as legitimacy and erroneously interpreted CFA results as proving one is correct,
then by definition it cannot be an empirical question whether one (or more) of these
judgements is the most important to some overarching judgement of the right to power.
Comparing the factor loadings of the four first-order latent constructs would not provide much
that is informative because there is no requirement that legitimacy is unidimensional. One has
before the fact decided that they are so important to legitimacy that they collectively constitute
the very judgement itself.
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The third problem with the approach taken by Sun and colleagues is that it leaves no room
for the idea that other judgements might come into play when people are thinking about the
normative appropriateness of police activity. These might be many and varied, and some might
bemorally troubling from a normative perspective. Somewhite US citizens, for example, might
believe police are behaving appropriately when they target black US citizens, not because they
think this makes policing more effective or fair—although they might also believe this–but
because they have been socialised or otherwise come to believe this is just the way police
should behave. Given the history of the USA vis-à-vis some other liberal democracies (Alex-
ander 2012), there is no necessary reason to assume this would be the case elsewhere, although
of course it might be. This is, to our minds, an empirical question worthy of investigation.
But the measurement model specified in Sun et al. (2018) renders such investigation
analytically and conceptually difficult because it defines legitimacy only as procedural justice,
distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness. One would have to assume, for example, that
racially targeted policing in a given context is only a source of legitimacy to the extent that it
influences beliefs about fairness, effectiveness and lawfulness. If it does not, then it has no
effect on legitimacy. Indeed, nothing could have an effect on legitimacy if it did not have an
effect on at least one of the four constructs. And, if one a priori defines procedural justice,
distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness as legitimacy, then legitimacy cannot be
constituted by anything else (otherwise one would have defined it as that too).
We counsel against Sun et al.’s (2018) study starting a trend in criminology, where
researchers in a novel context use the same approach to defining and measuring police
legitimacy as Tankebe (2013), use CFA in the same way as Tankebe (2013) and conclude from
their findings that there is empirical evidence that the story that emerges from the novel context
is different from that in the USA, UK and Australia. Studies like Sun et al. (2018) may pop up
everywhere, find ‘supportive evidence’ because the itemswill scale well nearly everywhere that
one looks, and make the same mistake of concluding that legitimacy is procedural justice,
distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness on the basis of the fitted CFA model. Dressed
up as an empirical finding, the approach does the opposite of ‘embracing cultural diversity’, to
paraphrase Sun et al. (2018: p. 5). It assumes beforehand that these judgements concern
procedural justice, distributive justice, effectiveness and lawfulness. So, we have what is a
curious mix of the normative concept and the empirical concept of legitimacy. Public opinion
matters with regard to overall levels of legitimacy in a given society, but it is the researcher who
is imposing the substantive requirements for empirical legitimacy.
The answer to all these problems is obvious and is already employed in much of the
literature. If legitimacy is conceptualised and measured as something distinct from assessments
of officer fairness, effectiveness and lawfulness (i.e. a more overarching judgement of the
institution’s right to power and authority to govern), then it is possible to assess which if any of
these is most important as a predictor of legitimacy. Similarly, if legitimacy is distinct and
different from the four factors, then the influence of other variables is conceptually and
analytically far easier to assess, since other judgements of the normative appropriateness of
police activity are allowed to have effects distinct from any correlation with perceptions of
fairness, effectiveness and lawfulness. For instance, respecting the limits of one’s rightful
authority may be important to legitimacy above and beyond perceptions of the procedural
justice of the police (Huq et al. 2017; Trinkner et al. 2018).
To close, we do think there is space for alternative approaches to measuring legitimacy.
Legitimacy is an abstract and unobservable psychological construct, and there are numerous
ways to operationalise the perceived right to power, aside from the standard ways of
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institutional trust and/or normative alignment and/or obligation to obey (Tyler and Jackson
2013). But researchers need to be aware of the limits of different approaches when trying to
decide which approach to measurement is preferable. In the current case, the methodology of
Sun and colleagues means ironically imposing top-down rather than discovering bottom-up the
normative content of legitimacy. There may be normative and/or theoretical and/or practical
reasons to decide this. But it is, in our view, crucial to be clear that this is what one is doing,
especially when the analytical strategy offers little empirical support for the central conceptual
claim.
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